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KIRSTEN M. BATKIN

New Zealand's Quota Management
System: A Solution to the
United States' Federal Fisheries
Management Crisis?
ABSTRACT
This article provides a comparative analysis of the fishery management systems in the United States and New Zealand. The paper
focuses upon the legal framework and economic theories of each
management regime and analyzes the efficacy of both management
systems. The objectives of the articleare to provide non-economists
with an understandingof the economic theory which underpins each
management system and to suggest that the fishery management
approach in New Zealand may provide a solution to the current
fishery crisis in the United States.
INTRODUCTION
[Flishermen have given the world a handful of aphorisms, but one you seldom hear them say anymore is this: It's
a big ocean out there... Man versus fish used to be a fair
match up. But the ancient chase turned into a rout; in many
quarters, it's all but over and-surprise-mankind has won.
To the victors go the empty seas.... Virtually every major
American fishing region outside of Alaska is in severe trouble;
nearly 80% of the nation's known commercial species are now
overfished or harvested to the limit of what can be sustained.... Landings of cod, haddock and flounder, the
principal ground fish that have long supported the New
England Fleet, are near their lowest recorded levels. Most of
Georges Bank a centuries-old mother lode, has been closed to
commercial fishing; biologists say it is all but played out.
Coastal communities in the Northeast and the Pacific Northwest have been declared Federal disaster areas.'
The above commentary illustrates the severity of the crisis facing
* The authorwould like to thank the following people for their assistance: Professors
William Schulze and Jon Conrad; Mr Edward Ballisteri; and Mr Ross Philipson.
1. Timothy Egan, Hook, Line and Sunk, New York Times Magazine, 75-76.
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the United States in relation to the depletion of its fisheries. The main
purpose of this article is to examine whether or not the Quota Management System ("QMS") implemented in New Zealand could provide a
solution to this crisis.
Sections I and II of this article examine the legislative basis of the
fishery management regimes in the United States and New Zealand
respectively and also assess each regime's success in managing its fishery
resource. In relation to the United States, the fishery resource off the
northeast coast of the United States ("the Northeast Atlantic Fishery") 2 is
used as an example.
Full assessment of the two different fishery management regimes
reviewed in this article requires an understanding of the economic theory
underlying each regime. In its 1993 report on the status of the Northeast
Atlantic Fishery, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
conceded that while "economic efficiency is central to the wellbeing of the
U.S. fishing industry, to processors, and to thousands of fresh seafood
consumers in the Northeast", its "meaning and scope are poorly understood."3 Section III of this article uses simple economic models to illustrate the economic theory behind both the United States and the New
Zealand fishery management regimes. Section IV contains a comparative
analysis of the two fishery management regimes (from an economic and
a legal perspective) and the article is concluded in Section V.
I. UNITED STATES SYSTEM OF FEDERAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT
A. NATURE OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL FISHERIES
The United States possesses extraordinary ocean fisheries
resources. In 1976, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act ("the Magnuson Act") established a 200 mile Fishery Conservation
Zone ("FCZ") off the coast of the United States4 . The FCZ later evolved

2. The Northeast Atlantic Fishery is the fishery resource off the northeast coast of the
United States from Cape Hatteras to Nova Scotia, see U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA
Tech. Mem., NMFS-NE-108, Status of Fishery Resources off the Northeastern United States for
1994, 1 an.,1995) (hereinafter Status of FisheryResources 1994).
3. United States Department of Commerce, NOAA Technical Memorandum, NMFSF/NEC-101, Status of Fishery Resources off the Northeastern United States for 1993, 32 (October
1993) (hereinafter Status of Fishery Resources 1993).

4. The FCZ is a zone contiguous to the United States' territorial sea (the territorial sea
extends 12 miles from the United States' coast). The inner boundary of the FCZ is a line
coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States, and the outer
boundary of the FCZ is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical
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into the United States' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ"). 5 Consequently,
the United States has jurisdiction over 2.2 million nautical square miles
of ocean;6 an area almost three times larger than all of the public lands
in the United States. While the geographical scope of the United States'
EEZ is impressive, the significance of the United States' EEZ lies in the
extremely abundant fishery resource that it contains due to the wide and
shallow continental shelves situated off the coasts of New England and
Alaska, and in the Gulf of Mexico. In fact, the United States' EEZ contains
approximately twenty percent of the world's marine fisheries.!
Three factors complicate fishery management within the United
States' EEZ. First, the United States' EEZ contains enormously diverse
commercially harvested species. As a result, diverse reproductive patterns
and methods of harvesting have to be balanced," Second, many of the
commercial species spend some part of their life cycle in coastal wetlands,
estuaries and streams. Consequently, the maintenance of coastal habitat
is another critical factor in managing the stocks of these species.9 Finally,
there are commercial species of fish that migrate to and from the United
States' EEZ and therefore they do not spend their entire life within the
United States' EEZ. As a result, the United States is unable to manage
these species through out their entire life cycle without the co-operation
of other countries. 0 All of these factors present an enormous challenge
to the management of the United States' federal fisheries.

miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (1985).
5. The FCZ evolved into an 8EZ due to the LOS Convention which established
internationally the concept of EEZs and also due to President Reagan's Proclamation of an
EEZ establishing United States sovereignty over resources within 200 miles of the United
States Coast. See Eldon V.C. Greenberg, Ocean Fisheries 371, 387, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (C. Campbell-Sohn, B. Breen & J.W. Futrell, eds., Ist ed. 1993).
6. Under the EEZ,the United States claims sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all fish and all Continental Shelf fishery resources (16 U.S.C.A. §
1811(a) (1995)). This exclusive fishery management authority extends to: "(1) All
anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species beyond the exclusive economic zone; except that that management authority does not extend to any such
species during the time they are found within any waters of a foreign nation" and "(2) All
Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the exclusive economic zone" (16 U.S.C.A. §
1811(b) (1995)).
7. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 374.
8. Status of FisWry Resources I994, supra note 2, at 12.
9. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 375.
10. Id. at 389.
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B. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES' FISHING INDUSTRY
Historically, the United States' domestic fishing industry
consisted of small family or individually owned businesses that used
small boats to harvest fish. from coastal areas near the villages in which
the fishers resided. The industry continued in this fashion until the mid
1970s.1 From 1938 to 1973 the level of fish harvested within the United
States' territorial waters
barely changed, increasing only from 4.3 billion
2
to 4.7 billion pounds.
The static nature of the United States' domestic fishing industry
contrasted greatly with the expansion in foreign fishing off the United
States' coast, beyond the United States' territorial waters, especially off
the coasts of Alaska and New England. By the mid 1970s nearly 70
percent of the fish caught off the coast of the United States was harvested
by foreign fishers.1 Foreign fishers, principally from the Soviet Union,
Japan and Eastern Europe used factory trawlers (integrated harvesting
and processing vessels) to harvest groundfish."4 While the foreign fishers
did not compete directly with traditional United States! fishers 5 they illustrated the existence of a substantial fishery resource that was not being
exploited by the United States.16
Concerns about the exploitation of this fishery resource by foreign
fishers resulted in the enactment of the Magnuson Act in 1976. The
Magnuson Act increased the jurisdiction of the United States from twelve
to 200 miles from its coast, thereby limiting the activities of foreign
fishing fleets fishing within the United States' FCZ. The period
following the enactment of the Magnuson Act was characterized by the
growth and development of the United States' fishing industry in
utilizing the fishery resources formerly exploited by foreign fishing vessels. In 1993, the United States' commercial landings were estimated to
be in excess of 4.7 million metric tons, of which the Northeast Atlantic

11. Id. at 378-79. The one exception to this pattern was the United States tuna fishing

fleet based in San Diego. Id. at 380.
12. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step

Toward Improved Management of Marine Fishers, 52 Wash. L Rev. 427, 431 (1977), cited
in Greenberg, supra note 5, at 379.
13. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 380.
14. Id.

15. The foreign fishers harvested different species in different fishing grounds to those
traditionally exploited by United States' fishers.
16. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 380.

17. The Fishery Conservation Zone has since evolved into the Exclusive Economic
Zone, see note supra 5.

Fail 19961

NEW ZEALAND'S QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Fishery contributed approximately 0.75 million metric tons (16 percent).
In 1993, the Northeast commercial oceanic and estuarine
fisheries produced domestic landings worth $869 million (preliminary figure). 19
C. CURRENT UNITED STATES' FISHERIES MANAGEMENT / LAW
1.1. The Magnuson Fisheries Conservationand Management Act Jurisdiction
The Magnuson Act creates federal jurisdiction over the fisheries
contained in the United States' EEZ. The United States' EEZ extends
from the outer boundary
of state waters to 200 nautical miles from the
20
United States' coastline.
1.2. Objectives
A principal objective of the Magnuson Act is the preparation and
implementation of fishery management plans that will "achieve and
maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield'from each fishery"2'
within its jurisdiction. Optimum Yield is defined in the Magnuson Act
as the amount of fish which provides the "greatest overall benefit to the
Nation with particular reference to food production and recreational
opportunities; and ...which is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified from any relevant economic, social or ecological factor". '
Maximum sustainable
yield is the surplus production of the fishery which is "the safe upper
limit of harvest which can be taken consistently year after year without
diminishing the stock so that the stock is truly inexhaustible and
perpetually renewable. 2n
While the concept of Optimum Yield is the "cornerstone" 4 of
the federal fisheries' management regime under the Magnuson Act, it has
been criticized because of its vagueness. In 1986, a "blue ribbon panel"
18. Status of Fishery Resources 1994, supra note 2, at 9.
19. Id. at 19.
20. U.S.D.C. v Axelsson & Johnson Fish Co. & Ors. 5 O.RW. 51, 56 (1987).
21. 16 U.S.C.A.

§

1801(b)(4) (1985).

22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(21) (1995).
23. Helen M. Kennedy, The 1986 Habitat Amendments to the Magnuson Act, A New
ProceduralRegime For Activities Affecting Fisheries Habitat,18 Envt. L. 339, 364 (1988) (citing
H.R. Rep No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 593, 615).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 445, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 46, cited in Greenberg, supra note 5, at 376.
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convened by the federal government, criticized the concept of Optimum
Yield as being "flawed," noting that it "has been, and still is, a widely
fluctuating guideline varied to suit the eyes of the beholder or the needs
of special interests." 2 The panel concluded that the primary focus of
federal fisheries' management should be to prevent overfishing. It
therefore urged the revision of the Magnuson Act to ensure that the
harvest 26
"does not exceed the acceptable biological catch from each
fishery."'
In 1989 the federal fishery management guidelines were revised
partially in response to this criticism. Those revisions called for an objective and measurable definition of overfishing for each managed stock or
stock complex and for the preparation of a stock assessment and fishery
evaluation (SAFE) report on an annual or other appropriate basis for each
fishery to ensure that overfishing does not occur.2 ' The Magnuson Act
requires these reports to be based on the "best scientific information
available."'
1.3. Descriptionof the United States Fisheries Management Administrative
Framework
(a) Agencies
The Magnuson Act is implemented mainly by the NMFS. 21 This
federal agency has information-gathering, enforcement and advisory
roles.' Its information-gathering role is crucial to the fisheries management process, particularly in relation to stock assessments and other
scientific research. The Regional Fisheries Management Councils
("Regional Councils") use that and other information to establish their
fisheries management strategies. 31 Consequently, the accuracy of the
information supplied by NMFS to the Regional Councils is critical.

25. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Fishery Management
Study 10 (June 30, 1986) 29, cited in Greenberg, supra note 5, at 376.
26. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Fishery Management
Study 10 (June 30, 1986) 28, cited in Greenberg, supra note 5, at 376-377.
27. 54 Fed.Reg 30826 (July 24, 1989) (the initiative is codified at 50 C.F.R., 602.11, 12),
see Greenberg, supramnote 5, at 377.
28. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(2) (1985).
29. The staff of NMFS consists of biologists and fishery managers, see Greenberg, supra
note 5, at 414.
30. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 414.
31. Id. at 415. For further information in relation to the roles and responsibilities of
NMFS see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 415.

Fall 1996]

NEW ZEALAND'S QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Magnuson Act established eight Regional Councils all of
whom have a key role in fisheries' management under the Act.' They
are required by the Act to develop Fishery Management Plans ("FMPs")
for each of the fisheries located within their respective regions.'
(b) Fishery Management Plans
FMPs are essentially documents which contain the policies for the
management of each fishery in a region. Under the Magnuson Act, each
plan must contain (among other things) a description of the fishery
together with an assessment of its condition and the conservation and
management measures that are being implemented. Furthermore, each
plan should specify the pertinent data that will be submitted to the
Secretary of Commerce.' The Magnuson Act grants the Regional Councils some discretion in relation to the inclusion of other types of information. Thus, "FMPs do not contain rigid, numerical management
measures, such as fixed quotas, times, or areas, but instead provide
instructions for determining or changing specified management measures
on an annual basis in light of the most current scientific information. " s
The FMPs are submitted for approval through NMFS to the
Secretary of Commerce. The role of the Secretary of Commerce is to
review the legality of the FMPs and to examine whether the FMPs are
consistent with the seven national standards.' The Regional Councils
are responsible for preparing regulations to implement the FMPs37 but
it is the responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate the
32. The eight councils and their composite states are as follows: New England Council
(Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut); Mid-Atlantic
Council (New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia); South
Atlantic Council (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida); Caribbean Council
(Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico); Gulf Council (Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama and Florida); Pacific Council (California, Oregon, Washington and

Idaho); North Pacific Council (Alaska, Washington and Oregon) and Western Pacific Council
(Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) 16 U.S.C.A. §
1852(a)(1)-(8) (1995).
33. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h)(1) (1985). Each Regional Council includes members
appointed by the Department of Commerce (on the recommendation of the governor of each
state within the region), the Regional Director of NMFS and the principal marine fishery
management official in each constituent state. The Regional Councils are also able to
employ fishery managers, biologists and economists and to establish and seek the advice
of scientific and statistical committees and fishing industry advisory committees.
34. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(a) (1995).

35. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 421 and 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b) (1995). For more information regarding FMPs see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 400-401.

36. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a)(1)(B) (1995). The seven national standards are contained in
section 301(a) of the Magnuson Act (1985).
37. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(c) (1985).
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regulations required to implement the FMPs when they have been approved.30
1.4.
Act

Mechanisms for Federal Fisheries Management under the Magnuson

Under section 303(b) of the Magnuson Act" the following
mechanisms are available to assist in the management of each fishery:
o
o
o

o
o

permits
time and area closures
quotas establishing the total amount of fish which may be
removed from a fishery over a period of time or by a particular
group of harvesters
bag limits (maximum limits per day or per vessel)
sale and gear restrictions e.g. to minimize by-catch.40

The Magnuson Act also permits the following types of restricted-access
mechanisms:
o
"

license limitations (i.e. restricting fishing rights to a group of
identified license holders)
allocation of individual fishing quotas assigning specific quantities of annual harvest rights.4'

Where a permit system is implemented, the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe fees to be paid by the permit holders. However, the Magnuson
Act prohibits the imposition of fees in excess of the administrative costs
to issue the permits.4 The mechanisms selected for the management of
a particular fishery are contained in its FMP.

38. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(a) (1995).
39. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b) (1985).
40. STIOWN CANNING Co. V. MOSBACHER, 731 FSupp. 32 (D.Me.1990); Nat'l Fisheries

Inst. v. Mosbacher, 732 F.Supp. 210, cited in Greenberg, supra note 5, at 421.
41. 16 US.C.A. § 1853(b)(6), see Greenberg supra note 5, at 422-423. Such restricted
access systems have been used for the groundfish fishery in Hawaii and the Mid-Atlantic

surf clam fishery.
42. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(d) (1985).
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1.5. Enforcement
Sections 307 and 311 of the Magnuson Act contain the principal
enforcement mechanisms.' Violation of permits issued or regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Magnuson Act result in civil not criminal
sanctions." The civil penalties provided for by the Magnuson Act are
monetary penalties of up to $100,000 per incident", and/or suspension
or revocation of permits,* and/or forfeiture of fish, vessels or gear.!7
While forfeiture of gear and vessels is rare, forfeiture of fish is routine.'
Other types of violations, such as obstructing or assaulting enforcement
officers, resisting arrest, submitting false fishery information and violations by foreign fishers, constitute criminal offenses under the Magnuson
Enforcement of the Act is carried out principally by NMFS
Act.4
agents, who bring cases before an Administrative Law Judge.
D. HAS THE CURRENT FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
REGIME WORKED?
The crucial test in determining the success or failure of the
current fishery management regime must be whether or not it has successfully prevented overfishing of the United States' federal fisheries.'
Statistics relating to the Northeast Atlantic Fishery indicate that the
current fishery management regime has failed. In 1994, NMFS conduded:
Both the research trawl data and the aggregate trawl fishery
data suggest major changes in the abundance of resources in
the Northwest [sic) Atlantic, especially since the implementation of the [Magnuson Act] in 1976. Increases in abundance of
groundfish and flounders associated with the reduction of
foreign fishery [sic) effort during the mid-1970s were followed

43. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857-1861 (1995).
44. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a), § 1858(g), § 1859(a) & § 1860 (1995).
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (1995).

46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(g) (1995).
47. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (1985).
48. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 405.

49. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(a) (1995).
50. For more information see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 405,414 and 415. The United
States' Coast Guard assists with at-sea enforcement, see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 416.

51. One of the national guidelines (for the preparation of FMPs) states that "conservation and management measures [contained in FMPs] shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States' fishing industry". 16 USC.A. § 1851(a)(1) (1985).
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by increased domestic fishing effort and landings. Abundance
of groundfish and flounders began declining after 1978, AND
CURRENTLY ARE AT HISTORICALLY LOW LEVELS [emphasis added]."52
NMFS also found that between 1991 and 1993 commercial landings of the
Northeast Atlantic Fishery's "traditional" groundfish species' declined
by 47 percent.' representing a decrease in value of $38.2 million.' In
addition, from October 1994, the Georges Bank Fishery was closed to
commercial fishing to allow fish stocks to recover.'
These factors indicate that the current legislative regime has failed
to prevent overfishing in the Northeast Atlantic Fishery. If the Northeast
Atlantic Fishery is representative of the condition of other fisheries within
the federal fishery regime then a radical revision of the current system is
essential to ensure the survival of the fishing industry and the resource
upon which the industry relies.
II. NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM OF FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT-QMS
A. NATURE OF THE NEW ZEALAND OCEAN FISHERY
New Zealand is a small island nation which lies in the South
Pacific Ocean between 30r and 500S at approximately at 170'E.' Prior
to 1978, New Zealand's Territorial Sea extended only three miles from its
coast but on April 1, 1978, its Territorial Sea was increased to 12 miles
offshore.' In 1978, New Zealand declared a 200 mile EEZ," bringing
within its jurisdiction 1.3 million square nautical miles of sea (more than
fifteen times its land mass).' The fact that only a very small percentage

52. Status of Fishery Resources 1994, supra note 2, at 15.

53. Traditional groundfish species in this context means cod, haddock and yellowtail
flounder.
54. Status of FisheryResources 1994, supra note 2, at 21.
55. In this period, the value of the landings of these groundfish species decreased from
$96.3 million to $58.1 million. Id.
56. Fishing Fleets Are Battling Territory Along Coast, New York Times, March 4, 1995
(hereinafter Fishing Fleets Are Battling Territory Along Coast).
57. Bruce D. Shallard, A Profile of New Zealand's Quota Management System, 10 Bureau
of Rural Resources Proceedings, 123 (1991).
58. New Zealand Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, 27 R.S.N.Z.

§ 3 (1991).
59. New Zealand Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1977,27 R.S.N.Z.

§ 9 (1991).

1 60. Shallard, supra note 57, at 123.
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of this area of sea is continental shelf contrasts starkly with the wide and
shallow continental shelves off the coast of the United States. Consequently, the United States' fishery resource is considerably more
abundant than the New Zealand fishery resource.
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEW ZEALAND FISHING INDUSTRY
Until the late 1970s New Zealand had a small inshore domestic
fishery operating to a depth of 200 meters and the deep water fishery
beyond the 12 mile zone was exploited by foreign fishing vessels from
Japan, Korea and the Soviet Union." However, after New Zealand
created its EEZ, New Zealand fishers began exploiting the deep water
fishery within New Zealand's EEZ.
The New Zealand inshore fishery was deregulated in the early
1960s, granting domestic fishers free and open access to the inshore
fishery. In addition, the New Zealand Government actively encouraged
investment in the exploitation of the inshore fishery by offering fishers
various financial incentives.' In the late 1970s and the early 1980s,
however, the New Zealand Government restricted entry to the inshore
fishery because the inshore fishery was coming under increasing
biological pressure.' This change in policy did not reduce the level of
investment inharvesting fish from the fishery but resulted in increased
fishing effort." As a result, New Zealand's inshore fishery was under
severe biological and economic pressure due to overfishing, declining
catch per unit of effort and over capitalization of the fishing industry. "
In response to this fishery management crisis, the New Zealand
Government introduced the QMS as an innovative system of fishery
management. The QMS was implemented by the Fisheries Amendment
Act in 1986 in respect of New Zealand's inshore and deep water fisheries." The objectives of the QMS are to prevent overfishing and to
improve the economic efficiency of the fishing industry.'7

61. Ian N. Clark, Philip J. Major & Nina Mollet, Development and Implementation of New

Zealand's ITQ Management System, 5 Marine Resource Economics 325 (1988).
62.. Id. at 326.
63. Mechanisms employed to restrict access were the imposition of moratoriums on the

issuing of permits for certain species, and the establishment of limited entry controlled rock
lobster fisheries where fishers were issued non-transferable licenses. Id.
64. Clark ET AL, supra note 61, at 326.
65. Shallard, supra note 57, at 123.
66. In 1983, The Fisheries Act 1983 was enacted which among other things introduced
company transferable quotas for deep water trawl fisheries. Therefore while the 1986
amendment established the current QMS in New Zealand, the Fisheries Act 1983 provided
the basis for it.
67. Clark ET AL., supra note 61, at 327.
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By 1993, the total primary value08 of seafood production from
the New Zealand fishery was NZ $611.5 million' and it appears that
the QMS has improved the health of the New Zealand fishery and fishing
industry since its implementation in 1986. °
C. CURRENT NEW ZEALAND FISHERIES MANAGEMENT /LAW
1. Implementation of the Quota Management System
Under the QMS, commercial fishers are allocated Individual
Transferable Quota ("ITQ") which grant them tradable rights to harvest
specific quantities of the surplus fish stock production (Total Allowable
Commercial Catch ("TACC"). The fundamental principles underlying the
QMS are "to protect the resource and, within that constraint, maximize
efficiency" of the fishing industry."
The initial allocation of ITQ was made on the basis of catch
history.' At the time of implementing the QMS, many species were
being overfished and the industry was over capitalized.'3 In order to
obtain industry co-operation and realistically achieve a reduction in
harvesting levels that matched the TACC based on the fish stock surplus,
the. government opted to buy back catch history from the fishers who
wanted to leave the industry or reduce their level of investment in the
industry.' Consequently, the government was able to reduce the
number of ITQs allocated, to the industry. ITQ have now been granted
in respect of thirty-two species of fish, shellfish and rock lobster.'

68. The primary value is calculated by multiplying greenweight catch by an estimated
port price.
69. New Zealand Fishing Industry Board, The New Zealand Seafood Industry Economic
Review 1993 30 (May 1994) (hereinafter NZ Seafood Economic Review).
70. See discussion contained in section II. D. below.
71. Clark Er AL, supra note 61, at 334.
72. Allocation of ITQ on the basis of catch history means that the New Zealand
Government allocated ITQ to fishers in accordance with each fishers' average level of
harvest for a particular species of fish over two years chosen from a prior three year period.
Id. at 327.
73. Shallard, supra note 57, at 123.
74. Clark Sl"
AL., supra note 61, at 327 and Shallard, supra note 57, at 124.
75. NZ Seafood Economic Review, supra note 69, at 64.
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2. Components of the Quota Management System
2.1. The Establishment of Individual TransferableQuotas ("ITQs")
Under the QMS, fish cannot be harvested for sale without an
ITQ.7 An ITQ is a transferable property right allocated to commercial
fishers in the form of a right to harvest surplus production from fish
stocks (TACC)." rrQs are rights in PERFETUITY for all fish except rock

lobster in respect of which ITQ have been granted for a term of 25
years.' The value of an ITQ for a particular species is established in the
ITQ market and is determined largely by the capitalized value of
expected net income streams derived from the ITQ. Therefore the value
of an ITQ reflects expected harvesting costs, price, quality, availability,
and the relative health of the fishery.
2.2.

Transferabilityof ITQs

The fact that ITQs are transferable property rights is considered
to be the key to the success of the QMS because it allows a continuous
process of adjustment with respect to both the economic rationalization
of the fishing industry and the fine tuning of harvesting levels (matching
catch with quota)." In addition, the transferability of ITQs assists with
the attainment of the following three major objectives of the QMS. The
first objective is to achieve 'the optimal number and configuration of
fishers, vessels, and fishing gear to minimize the aggregate real cost of
harvesting any given catch. The second objective is to achieve a level of
catch that maximizes the benefit to the nation while ensuring a sustainable fishery and the third is to minimize enforcement, administration and
implementation costs.1'
2.3.
(a)

Allocation of ITQs
Establishment of Total Allowable Catch ("TAC")

The New Zealand EEZ is divided into a number of Quota Management Areas ("QMAs").5 ' In each of the QMAs, the Ministry of

76. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, 27 R.S.N.Z. § 2 & 28ZA (1991). 1TQs are established under sections 280 and 280A of the New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983.
77. Clark ur AL, supra note 61, at 329.
78. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 28F, 28FA, 28K & 28KA.
79. Shallard, supra note 57, at 124.
80. Clark ET AL, supra note 61, at 331.
81. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 2 & 28B.
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Agriculture and Fisheries ("MAF') establishes the level of fishing (TAC)
each species can sustain so that the fish stocks of each species produce
the Maximum Sustainable Yield ("MSY").8
(b)

Distributionof TAC amongst Fishers

After MAF establishes the level of TAC, it is allocated to tribal,
recreational, and commercial fishers, in that order of priority.' The
balance of the TAC available to commercial fishers is called the TACC.
MAF allocates the TACC to commercial fishers in accordance with the
ITQ(s) held by each commercial fisher." ITQs were originally specified
in absolute tonnage of, fish. Previously, the New Zealand Government
adjusted matched changes in TACC with ITQ fishing levels by either
buying back or selling ITQs. However, in 1990, variation in ITQs
resulting from changes in the TACC were redefined as a proportion of
the TACC (instead of an absolute amount) for each species.' The rationale for this change is that the latter mechanism results in greater
stability in the industry and requires less administration." As a result,
ITQ holders carry all of the costs of reductions in TACC but also capture
the benefits of any increases at no cost.
3.

Monitoring and Reporting Requirements

Three documents are used to collect harvesting information under
the QMS. These documents are called the Catch Return, the Licensed
Fish Receiver Return and the Quota Management Report. The skipper of
each boat must fill out a Catch Return when a catch is landed. The Catch
Return contains catch details such as the date, species, weight, quota
number the catch is caught under and identity of the purchaser to whom
the catch is sold. Commercial fishers are prohibited from selling their
catch to any one other than a Licensed Fish Receiver who must also
document the purchase of fish from harvesters." As a result of this
requirement, the Licensed Fish Receiver Return should contain essentially
the same information as the Catch Return. In addition, ITQ holders are
required to file Quota Management Reports on a monthly basis,
documenting fish harvested pursuant to their ITQ. ITQ holders-must also

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, 2 & 28D.
New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 28D.
New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 2, 280, 280A, 280B and 280C.
New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 280B, 280C, 280D, 280E.
Clark UT AL., supra note 61, at 348.
Shallard, supra note 57, at 125.
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keep invoices, receipts and/or dockets from Fish Receivers for at least
three years.
Enforcement officers are able to verify the information contained
in each of the three documents as they can be easily checked against each
other. The role of the Licensed Fish Receivers is pivotal to reducing the
ability of fishers to cheat the system. The Licensed Fish Receivers Return
makes the QMS different from fishery management systems developed
in other countries. If a discrepancy, between a Quota Management Report
and a Licensed Fish Receivers Return exists, an exception report is
prepared and an investigation is carried out to determine the cause of the
discrepancy.8
4. Enforcement
Prior to the introduction of the QMS, New Zealand used the
standard game-warden approach, apprehending lawbreakers and providing a presence to discourage illegal behavior." Effective implementation of this type of approach is extremely costly. Under the QMS,
the enforcement approach has changed from policing fishers to monitoring flow of product by establishing a paper trail from fishing vessel to
final sale. Enforcement now takes place more on land than at sea, which
is more cost effective and is carried out by people who have the role of
auditor rather than game warden.'
Under the QMS, any contravention of or failure to comply with
the Fisheries Act 1983 constitutes a criminal offense and the resulting
penalties are substantial.'
5. Fine Tuning the Quota Management System in New Zealand
(a)

By-catch

One of the more difficult problems encountered in the implementation of the QMS in New Zealand was the treatment of by-catch. This
problem arises when a fisher is harvesting the species pursuant to his or

88. Clark Er AL, supra note 61, at 330 and Shallard, supra note 57, at 126.
89. Clark ur AL, supra note 61, at 333.
90. Clark Er AL., supra note 61, at 334 and Shallard, supra note 57, at 125.
91. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 107 & 107B. The maximum fine on conviction
is NZ $250,000 with an additional fine of NZ $1,000 per day for the commission of a
continuing offense. In addition, for certain types of convictions (including fraud relating
to fishery records and returns), any property used in the commission of the offense, the
affected catch(es) and proceeds of sale, and relevant quota, can be forfeited to the crown.
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her ITQ and inevitably catches some species not covered by that ITQ (i.e.
non-target species). Thus, within the QMS, a mechanism was needed
which encouraged the fisher to land the fish rather than dumping it but
which also discouraged the fisher from harvesting species not covered by
ITQ held by him or her. To deal with this problem the QMS was
adjusted to enable fishers to either surrender the by-catch to the
government at a prescribed price or buy, lease or use another commercial
fishers' ITQ to cover the bycatch.'2 The treatment of by-catch still
remains a difficult issue and it has not yet been resolved.
(b) Fisheries Task Force Report
In 1991, the New Zealand Government established a Fisheries
Task Force to review the fisheries legislation. The Task Force published
a report" containing a number of recommendations designed to
improve the QMS. None of these recommendations affect the fundamental principles of the QMS. A partial list of the recommendations relating
to the commercial fishery includes:
o
changing the design of the quota so that it can be split into two
legal instruments:
o
ITQ: a right in perpetuity to a percentage of the TACC
ACE: an Annual Catch Entitlement derived from the ITQ
o
These legal instruments are designed to improve the ability of
fishers to use their ITQ as security for finance.
tiering the criminal sanctions so that the penalty for breach of the
o
regime can more appropriately fit the crime
o
changing the criteria for the allocation of quota so that where
new commercial species are being developed there is not an
incentive to 'fish for quota.'
D. HAS THE QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WORKED?
In the period from 1989 to 1993, total production from the New
Zealand EEZ, employment levels in the catching and processing segments
of the industry and the TACC levels for most commercial species have
remained stable." New Zealand fishers have also increased their
investment in the industry replacing foreign fishing effort and increasing
the proportion of the total catch that is landed in New Zealand for

92. New Zealand Fisheries Act 1983, § 28ZD, 28ZE, 28ZF, 28ZG & 105A.
93. Sustainable Fisheries, Tiakina Nga Taonga a Tangarca, Report of the Fisheries Task
Force to the Minister of Fisheries on the Review of Fisheries Legislation (April 1992)
(hereinafter Sustainable Fisheries).

94. NZ Seafood Economic Review, supra note 69, at 26.
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further processing and/or distribution." Finally, ITQs are valuable
assets9 and in 1993 the rate of return on investment to major ITQ
holders was 17.7 percent (before interest and tax)."
IlL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A FREE ACCESS FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COMPARED WITH A QUOTA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This section of the article uses economic models to compare a
QMS with a free access system as mechanisms for fisheries management.
Figure 1 contains a graphical illustration of a simple bio-economic
model depicting the effect of harvesting a fishery both under a system of
free access and under a QMS. The bottom part of the graph illustrates
the effect of harvesting on a fishery (in terms of fish stock levels). The
population growth of the fishery is illustrated by the yield function F(N).
The vertical axis (N) shows a particular stock level at a particular time,
and the horizontal axis (AN) shows the change in stock level over a
period of time.
The top part of the graph illustrates the market for the fish
harvested from the fishery. The vertical axis shows the price (P) paid for
the quantity of fish harvested and the cost to harvest that quantity of fish.
It is assumed that the cost to harvest additional quantities of fish is
constant.' Consequently, the marginal cost curve and the average cost
curve for the industry are flat." It is also assumed that the fishing
industry is perfectly competitive"° and therefore in the long run the
industry makes only normal profits. In other words, the price of the fish
harvested equals the average and marginal costs of catching the harvest.
DH represents the demand function for fish harvested from the
fishery and H is used to depict the quantity of fish harvested. Assuming
that the species of fish comprising the fishery has just been discovered as

95. Id. at 8, 27 & 29.
96. Id. at 58.
97. Id. at 9.
98. This assumption is used to simplify the analysis and is not essential to the validity
of the model.
99. The marginal cost of the harvest measures the cost of harvesting the last unit of fish
caught. The average cost of the harvest is the total cost of the fish harvested divided by the
total units of fish caught.
100. A perfectly competitive industry is characterised by the existence of a large number
of similar sized operators without any barriers either to new operators entering the industry
or to existing operators leaving the industry.
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Figure 1.
Comparison Between Free Access and
QMS for Management of a Fishery
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a species suitable for commercial exploitation, its stock size starts at a point
of natural equilibrium, N*. The level of harvest, H*, is determined by the
demand for the new commercial species of fish (DH). The fish harvested
(H*) is sold at price P*, which equals the cost to harvest H* quantity of
fish.101 At harvest level H* the yield of the fishery (as depicted by F(N))
is being exceeded. If this level of harvest continues the stock size of the
will be unable
fishery will diminish to such a point that the fish population
1 2
to recover and will become extinct (i.e. where N=O). 0
The market price (P*) is too low to ensure the sustainability of the
fishery due to the inability of harvesters to obtain economic rent from the
fishery. This occurs because
the fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because
there is no assurance that they will be there for him tomorrow
if they are left behind today. A factor of production that is
valued at nothing in the business calculations of its users will
yield nothing in income. Common-property natural resources
are free goods for the individual and scarce goods for society.
Under unregulated private exploitation, they can yield no rent;
that can be accomplished only by methods which make them
private property or public (government property), in either
case subject to a unified directing power. '
...

This scenario closely resembles the management to date of the
Northeast Atlantic Fishery. In its 1993 report on the Northeast Atlantic
Fishery, NMFS concluded that:
With the notable exception of surfclam and ocean quahog
resources, which are subject to individual transferable quota
property rights, there was little progress toward improving the
resource rents of fish resources in the region in the past year.
The renewable fish resources themselves remain subject to
virtual open access, hence only harvest is valued. Past
attempts by management authorities to regulate harvest by
means of traditional effort and quota restrictions have served
only to increase the costs of management, enforcement and
fishing. A good illustration of this is in the New England
groundfish fishery, which is now widely recognized as being
l
grossly overcapitalized and its resources severely depleted.'

101. Due to free exit and entry, if supernormal profits (or losses) are made, additional
firms will enter (or exit) the industry, forcing profits back to a normal level.

102. The diminishing fish stock size is depicted in Figure 1. by the solid arrows. For
simplicity it is assumed that H* remains constant despite the declining stock size.
103. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common PropertyResource: The Fishery 108
(1954), reprintedin ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT-SELECTED READINGS (Robert
Dorfman & Nancy S. DoDrman, eds., 3d ed. 1993).
104. Status of FisheryResources 1993, supra note 3, at 32.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol 36

In contrast, under the QMS, the government takes control of the
fishery and allocates property rights (ITQ) to fishers to harvest a
percentage of the surplus fish production from the fishery."0 The
government restricts the level of harvest to Hq which is lower than H*.
At this level of harvest the price for the fish harvested rises to Pq. In
addition, the level of harvest equals the yield of the fishery (Hq=F(N)).
This prevents fish stocks from declining (the fish stock size Nq is maintained by the QMS). Thus, the QMS system of fisheries' management
restricts the harvest level of the fishery and ensures security of supply of
the resource enabling fishers to extract economic rent from the fishery.
An important feature of the QMS is the allocation of ITQ which
are TRADABLE property rights. This feature facilitates the efficient
harvesting of the fishery. From the perspective of the individual fisher,
the efficiency of ITQ can be illustrated as follows:
The profit function for a fisher is: P=PH-C(H)-VH
where: Ph is the revenue from harvesting a quantity of fish (h)
C(H) is the cost to harvest a quantity of fish (h)
vh is price of the quota which must be paid in order to harvest
a quantity of fish (h)
Continuing the assumption that the fishing industry is perfectly
competitive and that there are no barriers to exit and entry a fisher will
maximize profits in the long run where:
n=FH-C(H)-vH=O
Therefore the profit maximizing fisher will choose a level of harvest
where:
d7ddh=0 11"
=>p-C'-v=O
=>v=P-C'
The fisher's demand for quota is derived from his/her demand for
his/her profit maximizing level of harvest. The slope of the fisher's
demand for quota is negative (dv/dh= -C").11 Because quota are

105. For the purpose of this analysis of QMS it is assumed that the fish stock levels have
declined from N* to Nq due to the prior existence of a free access fisheries' management
system (as discussed in the preceding paragraphs). This assumption is used to approximate
the analysis more closely to the 'real world' where commercial fisheries in New Zealand
and the United States have already been exploited for a number of decades. While the
selection of Nq as a starting point is arbitrary, it suggests fish stock levels have declined
from the fishery's natural equilibrium (N*) and therefore is a more appropriate starting
point than N*.
106. This depicts the slope of the fishers profit function.
107. C' depicts the derivative of C(h) i.e. it represents the marginal cost of harvesting a
quantity of fish (h).
108. C" is the derivative of C' i.e. it represents the slope of the marginal cost curve of

harvesting a quantity of fish (h).
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tradable, fishers are able to buy and sell quota in order to maximize
profits. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 depicts the demand for quota (D.) and harvest (DH) for
each of the two fishers in the industry. The vertical axes reflect the price
of quota (V) and the horizontal axes show the level of harvest (H). It is
assumed that the government has allocated to Fisher I and Fisher 2 quota
to harvest H, and H2 quantities of fish respectively. The market price for
quota is V.. Taking the position of each fisher in turn:
oFisher 1 has been allocated quota to harvest H1 quantity of fish. At this
level of allocation Fisher I values his or her quota at price V, which is
less than the market price of V.. The market (other existing and potential fishers) values Fisher 1's quota more highly than he or she does.
Fisher 1 will therefore sell some of his or her quota which will result in
a lower harvest level of Hl'.
oFisher 2, on the other hand, has a profit-maximizing level of harvest
H2', and values quota more highly (V2) than at the prevailing market
price (V.). Fisher 2 will, therefore, buy quota to increase his or her level
of harvest to H2".
Thus, irrespective of the initial allocation of quota, the distribution of
quota gravitates to those fishers that value them most highly. A quota's
value to a fisher is dependent upon his or her profitability. Those fishers
who use low cost harvesting methods will generate higher levels of
profits and therefore value quota more highly than their less efficient
competitors. The more efficient fishers will put upward pressure on the
market price of quota, causing less efficient fishers to sell their quota and
eventually leave the industry.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. HOW DOES THE NEW ZEALAND QUOTA MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM COMPARE WITH THE UNITED STATES' FEDERAL
FISHERIES' MANAGEMENT REGIME?
1. Access to Fishery / Transfer of Fishery Property Rights to Fishers
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that there are fundamental differences between the QMS and the United States' federal
fisheries' management regime. One of the most significant differences

876
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Figure 2.
Market for a Tradable Quota
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relates to access. In New Zealand the TAC is divided among tribal,
recreational and commercial fishers. All fishers are subject to conservation regulations designed to preserve the resource, such as minimum
species sizes for fish caught.' Commercial fishers harvest their share
of the fishery resource for profit and therefore they must purchase ITQs.
On the other hand, tribal and recreational fishers have free access to the
fishery because they do not harvest fish for profit. However, tribal and
recreational fishers are subject to conservation measures such as bag
limits 10to ensure that they do not fish commercially without purchasing
ITQs.
Since the implementation of the QMS, recreational fishers have
experienced improved fishing in some inshore fisheries."' In addition,
the New Zealand Fishing Industry has moved into a more stable era
enabling fishers to engage in long-term planning and investment. These
activities are considerably more difficult when the viability of the
resource is in doubt.
In contrast to the QMS, the United States'. federal fisheries'
management regime is essentially an free-access fisheries' management
system for domestic fishers. Although agencies regulate fishers by
issuing permits, the fees paid by fishers to obtain the permits do not
include a price for access to the resource. A restricted access regime
where property rights to the resource are allocated to commercial fishers
is contrary to the current United States' policy and law that "users have
access112to the resource without acquiring a property right or paying a
rent."
In relation to the performance of the Magnuson Act, it has been
observed that "after 15 years of comprehensive federal fisheries management, the future of viability of the resource and the future viability of the
industry are not yet secured.""' If fishers are operating under a freeaccess fishery management system and they are uncertain about the
security of the fishery, they will maximize each of their harvesting opportunities by harvesting as much as possible, because they do not know
whether they will be able to fish in the future. This phenomenon is
known as the Tragedy of the Commons"" because each fisher behaves in

109. Regulations precsribing minimum species sizes for harvestable fish are designed to
enable juveniles to replenish fish stocks.
110. Any fish harvested for sale must be harvested pursuant to an ITQ: New Zealand
Fisheries Act 1983, § 2 & 28ZA.
111. Shallard, supra note 57, at 128.
112. Leitzell, The FederalGovernment Role in the United States Fishing Industry and Regulatory Reform, 119, 120 (Hennessey, ed. 1983) (Center for Ocean Management Studies) cited
in Greenberg, supra note 5,at 423.
113. Greenberg, supra note 5,at 441.
114. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science V. 1243-1248 (1968), re-
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the same way, accelerating the depletion of the resource upon which the
fishing industry relies. Thus, where a fishery is being overexploited, an
open acess fishery policy is likely to exacerbate the depletion of the
resource.
2. Mechanisms Used to Manage the Fishery
The mechanisms employed in fisheries management by the
United States and New Zealand are radically different. New Zealand's
commercial fishers have been allocated ITQs. ITQs have several positive
effects on the management of a fishery.
First, an ITQ is a right in perpetuity"' to harvest part of the
annual TACC. The long-term nature of this right promotes long-term
planning and investment, and reduces the likelihood of boom-bust
cycles
16
associated with over-exploitation and regulatory controls.'
Second, an ITQ is an essential asset to every commercial fisher's
business and is very valuable. Therefore each fisher has an incentive to
protect the value of his/her ITQ by harvesting the resource responsibly
(for example, by minimizing the harvest of undersized fish and by not
exceeding his or her quota limits). While these incentives alone will not
prevent fishers from cheating the system, they act to reduce the likelihood of fraud. 'In contrast, under the United States' system of federal
fisheries' management, the fishers do not have any proprietary interest
in the resource. They are unlikely, therefore, to feel the same degree of
responsibility for the fishery resource.
Finally, an ITQ is a tradable right. It can be leased, used as
security for loans and traded either to reduce investment in the industry
or exit the industry all together. As a result, those fishers in the industry
with lower harvesting costs will be more profitable and will value ITQ
more highly than their less efficient competitors. Thus, the more efficient
harvesters will buy ITQ from their less efficient competitors thereby
improving the efficiency of the industry. Under the United States' federal
fisheries' management regime there is no comparable mechanism to
promote the efficient harvesting of the fisheries within its jurisdiction.
3. Integrity and Collection of Fishery Information
A crucial part of fisheries' management is the collection of

printed in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT-SELECTED READINGS 5-19 (Robert
Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman, eds., 3d ed. 1993).
115. Rock Lobster is an exception to this general principle. ITQ for Rock Lobster are
granted for a term of 25 years.
116. Shallard, supra note 57, at 126.
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relevant harvest information because managers of fisheries need to know
the actual level of harvest in order to monitor fish stocks effectively. The
New Zealand QMS uses a system that maintains the integrity of
information received from the fishing industry. A few of the fisheries
within the United States' federal fisheries management regime require
processors to record information relating to the source of the fish
supplied to them. However, unless the law requires commercial fishers
to sell their catch to processors who must record and supply this
information to the NMFS, an accurate picture of the total harvest is not
obtainable.
4. Enforcement
The main enforcement approach embodied in the QMS in New
Zealand differs substantially from the enforcement regime used by the
United States. Enforcement officers under the QMS are essentially
auditors whose primary responsibility is to detect fraud on the part of
fishers, fish processors and/or ITQ holders. As a result, most of the enforcement occurs on land which is less costly than using a surveillance
system based at sea. By comparison under the United States' federal
fisheries management regime, a game warden approach is used, requiring
a lot of surveillance at sea.
Another aspect of enforcement is the perception of the nature of
a contravention of the fisheries management laws. In New Zealand
overfishing and misreporting are criminal offenses and are viewed as
a direct attack on the property rights of others.... they are
serious acts of fraud on other rights holders. Such offences
can also involve serious damage to the marine environment.
These crimes involve product of high value and the rewards
of offending can be very considerable.117
This view contrasts with the philosophy embodied in the Magnuson Act,
where violations of permits and regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Magnuson Act are not criminal acts. It seems that in the United States
the perception is that criminal sanctions are not appropriate for fishery
violations, where resource damage from any one violation, even if intentional is usually not grave .... "I

117. Sustainable Fisheries, supra note 93, at 44.
118. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 424.
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This philosophy is also evident from the dicta of Administrative
Law Judge Holan in a case in which he was sentencing a fisher for
breaching the Magnuson Act where he stated:
Retributive justice is not the purpose of these types of proceedings. Unlike criminal prosecutions, the underlying nature
of administrative proceedings is not to vindicate public justice.
Instead, the principal purpose to be served is remedial. Compensation, civil penalties, and license suspension or revocation
are the principal deterrence methods utilized. That there is
some punishment aspect to such remedies is incidental and is
not the n9 primary thrust of the action taken or remedy
sought.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be acknowledged that the following features of the
United States' fishery complicate the management of the fisheries within
the United States' EEZ:
a) existence of migratory species that cannot be managed
entirely within the United States EEZ;
b) an extremely productive fishery covering a large area due
to the nature of the continental shelves off the United States
coast; and
c) close proximity to a large number of other nations.
New Zealand, in comparison, has few migratory species, a narrow
continental shelf, and is geographically isolated from other countries.
Despite these differences, the New Zealand QMS as a fisheries management system has much to offer the United States. The Magnuson Act has
been widely criticized and the current fisheries management regime has
failed to prevent overfishing of commercial species.'
The United
States' economy would gain large benefits from the efficient exploitation
of its enormous fishery resource. However, the implementation of a QMS
similar to that used in New Zealand would require a change in the
United States' political and legal climates as they relate to fisheries
management. The QMS was implemented in New Zealand when the
fishing industry was in crisis. It seems that a radical change in the
United States' approach to fisheries management is necessary to enable
it to secure the benefits of a stable fishery resource and fishing industry.

119. U.S.D.C. v Greene & Greene 7 O.R.W. 172, 174 (1993).
120. Analysis as to the ExrurNiT of its failure is beyond the scope of this paper.

